


Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution

**Moritz Schneider, Aritra Dhar,
Ivan Puddu, Kari Kostianen,
Srdjan Capkun**


CHES 2022




Modern Computing




Modern Computing



Modern Computing



Modern Computing



source: AnandTech

Trusted Computing?




ARM TrustZone

AMD SEV



Trusted Computing?



AMD SEV


ARM TrustZone



**NVIDIA CONFIDENTIAL
COMPUTING**

Secure data and AI models in use.

Trusted Computing?



AMD SEV

ARM TrustZone




NVIDIA CONFIDENTIAL
COMPUTING

Secure data and AI models in use.


Modern vs Trusted Computing

- Specialized Computing devices
 - GPUs
 - Accelerators
 - Etc.
- CPU is mere coordinator
- Mostly limited to CPU
- No accelerator support*


Not Just Computing




Not Just Computing




Not Just Computing



Not Just Computing



Not Just Computing



TEEs on Specialized Hardware

TEEs on Specialized Hardware

- Stavros Volos, Kapil Vaswani, and Rodrigo Bruno (2018). “Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs”. In: [OSDI 18](#). USENIX Association
- Insu Jang et al. (2019). “Heterogeneous isolated execution for commodity gpus”. In: [ASPLOS](#)

TEEs on Specialized Hardware

- Stavros Volos, Kapil Vaswani, and Rodrigo Bruno (2018). “Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs”. In: [OSDI 18](#). USENIX Association
- Insu Jang et al. (2019). “Heterogeneous isolated execution for commodity gpus”. In: [ASPLOS](#)
- Sérgio Pereira et al. (2021). “Towards a Trusted Execution Environment via Reconfigurable FPGA”. In: [arXiv](#)

TEEs on Specialized Hardware

- [Stavros Volos, Kapil Vaswani, and Rodrigo Bruno \(2018\)](#). “Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs”. In: [OSDI 18](#). USENIX Association
- [Insu Jang et al. \(2019\)](#). “Heterogeneous isolated execution for commodity gpus”. In: [ASPLOS](#)
- [Sérgio Pereira et al. \(2021\)](#). “Towards a Trusted Execution Environment via Reconfigurable FPGA”. In: [arXiv](#)
- Many more...

TEEs on Specialized Hardware

- Stavros Volos, Kapil Vaswani, and Rodrigo Bruno (2018). “Graviton: Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs”. In: [OSDI 18](#). USENIX Association
- Insu Jang et al. (2019). “Heterogeneous isolated execution for commodity gpus”. In: [ASPLOS](#)
- Sérgio Pereira et al. (2021). “Towards a Trusted Execution Environment via Reconfigurable FPGA”. In: [arXiv](#)
- Many more...
- **Nvidia Confidential Computing**

Attacker Model

Goal: SGX Attacker Model

Attacker Model

Goal: SGX Attacker Model

- Local physical adversary
- Controls entire SW stack

Attacker Model



Goal: SGX Attacker Model

- Local physical adversary
- Controls entire SW stack



Attacker Model

Goal: SGX Attacker Model


- Local physical adversary
- Controls entire SW stack



Attacker Model

Goal: SGX Attacker Model


- Local physical adversary
- Controls entire SW stack




Attacker Model

Goal: SGX Attacker Model


- Local physical adversary
- Controls entire SW stack




Interaction with Peripherals




Interaction with Peripherals




Interaction with Peripherals



Interaction with Peripherals




Interaction with Peripherals




Memory mapped Registers

Interaction with Peripherals




Interaction with Peripherals




Memory Isolation Mechanisms can be used

Our Approach




Main Problems


Main Problems



Main Problems




Main Problems




Our Approach


- MMIO statically assigned
- DMA dynamically created by TCB
- Explicit connect and disconnect
- Based on Keystone (Lee et al. 2020)




Implementation




Context Switch Overhead




Accelerators and GPUs




Accelerators and GPUs



Accelerators and GPUs



Compute Cluster



Hardware Overhead

Area [μm^2]	PMP Entries		Overhead
	0	4*	
Core	5.7	6.7	15.5%
FPU	39.2	37.9	-3.3%
IPU	8.6	8.5	-1.4%
Total	53.5	53.2	-0.7%

Limitations


- What to do with drivers?
- Remote Attacker Model

Thanks


- Thanks to all the opensource projects that we used
 - Keystone
 - ETHZ RISC-V Cores

Backup/Nvidia Confidential Computing


Isolation on Nvidia GPUs



Isolation on Nvidia GPUs



Isolation on Nvidia GPUs



Isolation on Nvidia GPUs

